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1. JUDICIAL COMPARISON
2On July 2, 2009 , the Delhi High Court ruled that 
consensual sexual acts between adults in private 
are not criminal, and therefore declared that Section 
377 of the Indian Criminal Code violates Articles 21, 
14 and 15 of the Constitution.
In decriminalizing homosexuality, the Delhi Court 
had considerable recourse to foreign law. It 
established that Article 21 of the Constitution of 
India includes the recognition of human dignity, by 
making reference to Canadian Supreme Court 
judgements. It concluded that the freedom of 
speech and expression protected by Article 19 of 
the Constitution extends to the "right to be let alone", 
making extensive reference to the US Supreme 
Court cases on privacy. It established that targeting 
the homosexuals as a class is contrary to the 
principle of equality under Article 14 of the 
Constitution, reasoning on the basis of Supreme 
Courts decisions and dissenting opinions from the 
US, Canada and South Africa. 
It argued that there is a global trend in the protection 
of the privacy and dignity of homosexuals by 
referring to the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Supreme Courts of South Africa, the US, 
New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Australia. It held that 
public morality is not a valid basis for restricting           
the fundamental rights of homosexuals, quoting 
decisions of US, UK and South African courts. 
Lastly, it described the role of the judiciary as one of 
protecting the counter-majoritarian safeguards set 
out in the Constitution, citing the arguments of US 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson in West 
Virginia State Boards of Education v. Barnette 
(1943).
3On April 21 2010 , The United Kingdom Supreme 
Court ruled that certain notification requirements for 
sexual offenders constituted a disproportionate 
interference with their right to privacy (Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights),  
because they made no provision for review of 
individual cases.
The Supreme Court relied on a number of reasons 
in reaching this conclusion. These included the fact 
that registration requirements for sexual offenders 
exist in France, Ireland, the seven Australian States, 
Canada, South Africa and the United States, and 
almost all of these contain provisions for individual 
review.
Not every court decision that makes use of 
comparison with foreign law does so to such an 
extent as the Indian court in developing 
constitutional standards. Not every court asked to 
review national law in the light of the European 
Convention on Human Rights makes reference, as 
did the British court, to European and non-
European legal systems. But recourse to 
comparison is widespread, in spite of recurring 
1 Ponencia presentada en el marco del XVIII Congreso Internacional de Derecho Comparado desarrollado por  L'Académie Internationale de 
droit comparé y The American Society of comparative law en julio 26 de 2010. 
2 Judgement WP(C), No. 7455/2001
3 R (on application of F (by his litigation friend F)) and Thompson (FC) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) 
2010 UKSC 17.
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arguments against the application of foreign law. A 
recent bibliography on the use of foreign precedents 
by constitutional courts lists more than five hundred 
examples. Assuming that such an extensive group 
of scholars did not decide to write about a figment of 
the imagination, it can be concluded that recourse  
to comparison by constitutional judges is far from 
limited.
It must be added that constitutional courts often 
prepare their decisions taking foreign law into 
account, but subsequently give a minor importance 
to the comparative argument in their reasoning. For 
example, the Italian Constitutional Court was 
recently invited to verify the constitutionality of a 
statute that made illegal immigration a criminal 
offense, sanctioned with a fine and with expulsion 
from the State. The documents prepared prior to 
making this decision included a thorough 
examination of foreign law: German, British, 
French, Spanish, Austrian, Dutch, Greek,     
Danish, Finnish, Portuguese, and American.      
The judgement, however, made only a cursory 
mention of this thorough investigation, in spite        
4of the influence that it had on the decisión .
2. WHY IS JUDICIAL COMPARISON 
SPREADING?
Judicial comparison is becoming more widespread 
for many reasons:
a. Recourse to foreign law is increasingly provided 
for in national law. This is the case of Section 39 of 
the South African Constitution:  "when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum [....] may 
consider foreign law"; or the case in which national 
regulation of conflicts of law provide for the 
application of the most favourable rule (this requires 
an examination of foreign law, a comparison 
between that and local law, and an evaluation of 
which is more favourable).
b. National legal orders, face similar problems and it 
is, therefore, expedient to consider foreign law, to 
seek advice from others who have confronted the 
same problems, in order to find better solutions (e.g. 
by evaluating the advantages and/disadvantages of 
different solutions to a common legal problem): for 
instance, courts everywhere are engaged in the 
review of statutes enacted to fight international 
terrorism, and it is useful for them to make reference 
to foreign judicial decisions.
c. National legal orders are increasingly bound 
together in supra-national and in global regulatory 
regimes, which facilitate the opening up of national 
legal systems towards each other. The rise of world 
constitutionalism renders constitutional borders 
permeable and acts as a bridge, encouraging local 
courts to look beyond national borders. For 
example, if a national court is called upon to define 
the notion of "refugee", and if that court belongs to a 
country that has ratified the UN Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees (July 28, 1951), it may be 
expedient for that court to consider the interpre-
tation given to that instrument, and to that term, by 
other courts of UN Member States.
d. Some principles are universal (for example, 
human rights) and command respect in every 
domestic legal order.
e. Comparison can assist constitutional courts in 
identifying changes in national standards, traditions 
and values (using foreign constitutional practices as 
a form of "rear-view mirror"). For example, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand have, since the 1970s, 
faced similar problems with their indigenous 
communities and have had to change their 
approach to the rights of these groups. In doing so, 
their supreme courts referred to each other's 
decisions (and to those of the US Supreme Court) 
5when adjudicating these rights .
4 Judgment n. 250/2010.
5 See, for example, Supreme Court of New Zealand, Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington (1878) 3 NZ Jur(NS) SC 72, and Supreme Court of Canada, R. 
v. Van der Peet (1996) 2 S.C.R. 507.









3. WHAT WEIGHT TO ATTACH TO 
FOREIGN LAW?
How much weight should be attached to foreign 
law? There are two answers to this question:
a. Foreign law is binding as national law: an 
example is provided by the “lex alius loci” a principle 
followed by national courts in Europe throughout the 
lh lh17  and 18  centuries: this area was ruled by a "ius 
commune" (a common law) and, when a provision in 
a domestic legal order was missing, courts were 
entitled to use foreign law to fill the "lacuna". This 
practice came to an end with the codifications of the 
th19  century. In this case, foreign law becomes a rule 
or norm in the "borrowing" legal order, just as it is in 
the "lending" legal order.
A similar case is that of the "common constitutional 
traditions" of European countries. The European 
Court of Justice has frequently referred to these 
traditions in order to establish some basic common 
principles (such as the right to a hearing or access to 
justice), thus helping to make the national legal 
systems in the European legal space more porous.
b. Foreign law is merely a means of interpretation: 
given that comparison is a universal method of 
interpretation, and judges are interpreters of law, 
judges are of necessity comparatists. Comparison 
for courts is not, therefore, simply erudition or "soft 
law"; and nor does it furnish mere influential or 
persuasive  guidelines that require respectful 
consideration. Rather, it plays the same role as 
other methods of interpretation.
4. ARE THERE RULES OF 
INTERPRETATION BY COMPARISON?
Having ascertained that comparison is a method of 
judicial interpretation, I want now to turn to the 
following questions: What makes one court more 
likely to use this method than another? And should 
there be at least some basic rules of interpretation 
by comparison? At the outset, let me make one 
basic distinction:
a. Interpretation may be regulated by the legislator, 
as in the South African case;
b. or, as in the majority of countries, interpretation 
can be left free to the authorized interpreter In this 
case, the interpreter is not obliged to have recourse 
to foreign law or to compare it with national law. It is 
important here to ascertain which variables are 
most important in influencing the recourse to foreign 
law by national courts.
-  The use of a language that is common to many 
countries (English, Spanish) may facilitate 
comparison (and the widespread use of translating 
judgements of constitutional courts into English 
may enhance such comparison);
- Given that interpretation is based on legal culture, 
the greater the legal culture in question is open to 
comparison, the more willing the courts are to 
perform this function;
- Some countries are by tradition exporters of legal 
models and cultures (think, for example, of France, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States), 
whereas some are by tradition importers of legal 
models and cultures: in general, courts in the latter 
will be more open to comparison;
- The common law pays more attention to legal 
practices: as a consequence, common law courts 
have more frequent recourse to foreign 
judgements; 
- Common legal tradit ions (e.g. in the 
Commonwealth, or in the European legal space) 
establish basic conditions for dialogue and 
comparison;
- Judicial networks are growing, and constructing 
step-by-step an epistemic community: most 
constitutional courts translate their judgments into 
English; many courts have regular, periodic 
exchanges with their foreign equivalents (for 
example, members of the Italian Constitutional 
Courts attend some 15 meetings per year with their 
colleagues from foreign countries); and many 
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courts employ staff regularly charged with reading 
and summarizing foreign decisions.
- Some countries belong to a region where                 
trans-judicial communication is easier: for example, 
North America, in which US and Canadian law 
communicate frequently.
5. TOWARDS A BETTER JUDICIAL 
COMPARISON
If the court as interpreter is free to choose foreign 
law, is it possible to formalize the basis upon which 
this is done, or this is a field in which cherry-picking 
must be the rule? To which limits should judicial 
discretion conform in choosing which foreign law to 
consider? From this point of view, a few issues are 
crucial:
a. Which country to choose for comparison? Should 
a court choose only foreign law of countries which 
share the same constitutional commitments?                 
Or should comparison also take into account               
the foreign law of countries that take different 
approaches, and balance the various solutions?
The answer to this question is simple. A good 
comparison must not take into account only one or 
two foreign legal systems, chosen because they 
belong to the same area or region, or because they 
share the same values, or simply because they 
have a common language. A court - like any good 
comparatist - should consider the various legal 
"families" and weigh the differing solutions on offer, 
before arguing that one or more foreign legal 
systems provides a good example because it is 
more effective, or because it ensures more benefits, 
or because it is more congenial to the borrower's 
legal order.
b. What forms of foreign law should be involved: 
legislation, judgments, scholarship? As comparison 
is, at least for our purposes here, the task of courts, 
should they pay attention only to foreign judge-
made law?
Again, the answer is simple. Given that the law 
generated by legislatures, judges and, indeed, by 
scholars do not represent self-contained worlds, 
courts should have recourse to all: to foreign 
legislation, and to interpretations provided by both 
judges and law professors. One famous example of 
this approach is the Supreme Court of Canada's 
6decision on the Quebec secession , i-a-which a 
variety of statutes, regulations and international 
treaties, beginning with the "Magna Carta" were 
considered.
c. Should judicial comparison also take into account 
the different contexts in which laws apply?
Contrary to the prevailing opinion, national legal 
systems make use of a growing number of similar 
legal instruments (think of the "Ombudsman", the 
notice and comment procedure, the proportionality 
principie). These legal instruments are, however, 
applied in different contexts, as history, social 
values, and national constitutions differ from one 
country to another. These legal instruments are, 
however, applied in different contexts, as history, 
social values, and national constitutions differ from 
one country to another. These contexts render the 
legal institutions different: although structurally 
similar, they are functionally diverse. It is, therefore, 
crucial to take into account not only the legal 
institution to be compared, but also the legal 
environment in which it is applied.
d. How should foreign law be used? It can be used 
as a source of solutions to common problems, or to 
strengthen or support a decision, or as a benchmark 
to evaluate national law.
6. THE SO-CALLED "LEGITIMACY 
PROBLEM" OF JUDICIAL COMPARISON
Finally, there is the problem of legitimacy. As 
democracy tends to "nationalize" the law, borrowing 
foreign law may appear as a non-democratic move 
to those who support "legal particularism" and resist 
the use of foreign ideas. This question has 
generated much discussion in the US, where, in any 
6Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.









event, many courts (including the Supreme Court) 
make reference to foreign law; and where those 
who oppose the use of foreign law by American 
courts do not, to my knowledge, also oppose the 
use of US law by foreign courts.
This problem of legitimacy is wrong. Making 
reference to foreign law does not mean that national 
courts surrender State sovereignty. A court acting 
as comparatist does not renounce its decision-
making responsibility. It simply enlarges the 
"discussion" that precedes and informs the 
decision, by admitting to that "conversation" also 
actors that are foreign to the legal order in question.
This conclusion has been supported quite recently 
7by the US Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida , on 
the question of imposing sentences of life without 
parole on juveniles who did not commit homicide: 
"The Court has looked beyond our Nation's borders 
for support for its conclusions that a particular 
punishment is cruel and unusual", and that "the 
Court has treated the law and practices of other 
nations and international agreements as relevant to 
the Eighth Amendment not because those norms 
are binding or controlling but because the 
judgement of the world's nations that a particular 
sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic 
principles of decency demonstrates that the Court's 
rationale has respected reasoning to support it".
7.  CONCLUSIONS
Much of the literature on judicial comparison 
examines both the use of supra-national (and 
global) law and of foreign law, and focuses on the "to 
do or not to do" question.
This paper has approached the question from a 
different point of view. It has established a clear 
dividing line between supra-national and global law 
on one hand, and foreign domestic law on the other. 
The first cannot be considered as foreign, as it 
stems from obligations undertaken by national 
governments. Supra-national and global law can, 
however, facilitate the use of foreign domestic law.
Secondly, if judges interpret the (local) law, and if 
comparison is one of the methods of interpretation, 
then the right question to ask is not whether judges 
are entitled to make such comparisons, but rather 
how they should do so.
7 US Supreme Court, No. 08-7412, May 17, 2010.
